CVE-2016-5180 1-byte-write-heap-buffer-overflow in c-ares
c-ares는 비동기 DNS 요청을 위한 C 라이브러리이다. c-ares에서 발견된 heap buffer overflow 취약점 CVE-2016-5180을 알아보자.
target.cc
c-ares 퍼징 테스트를 위해 작성된 target.cc 파일을 먼저 살펴보자.
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <ares.h>
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t e) {
unsigned char *buf;
int buflen;
std::string s(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(Data), Size);
ares_create_query(s.c_str(), ns_c_in, ns_t_a, 0x1234, 0, &buf, buflen, 0);
free(buf);
return 0;
}ares_create_query함수 인자 값으로 Data 값을 캐스팅하여 전달한다.
ares_create_query : 단일 DNS 쿼리 버퍼 작성
reinterpret_cast : 포인터를 다른 포인터 형식으로 변환
string.c_str() : string 문자열의 첫번째 문자의 주소를 반환
이제 빌드하여 분석을 해보자.
mkdir -p ~/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180; rm -rf ~/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180; cd ~/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180
~/FTS/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180/build.sh clang -O2 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g -fsanitize=address -fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc-guard,trace-cmp,trace-gep,trace-div
CVE-2016-5180
Analysis
==20373:20373==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address >0x60400003faf1 at pc 0x0000004ec456 bp 0x7ffd4f99c210 sp 0x7ffd4f99c208
WRITE of size 1 at 0x60400003faf1 thread T0
#0 0x4ec455 in ares_create_query /root/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180/BUILD/>ares_create_query.c:196:3
#1 0x4eb73d in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /root/FTS/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180/>target.cc:14:3
#2 0x4f5e93 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, >unsigned long) /root/Fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:493:13
#3 0x4f60c0 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned >long) /root/Fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:450:3
#4 0x4f73fb in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /root/Fuzzer/>FuzzerLoop.cpp:700:30
#5 0x4f7657 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop() /root/Fuzzer/>FuzzerLoop.cpp:732:5
#6 0x4eecb4 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int ()(unsigned >char const, unsigned long)) /root/Fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:567:6
#7 0x4ec790 in main /root/Fuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10
#8 0x7f5f2f60e82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/>libc.so.6+0x2082f)
#9 0x41c5d8 in _start (/root/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180/>c-ares-CVE-2016-5180+0x41c5d8)0x60400003faf1 is located 0 bytes to the right of 33-byte region [>0x60400003fad0,0x60400003faf1)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4bd893 in __interceptor_malloc (/root/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180/>c-ares-CVE-2016-5180+0x4bd893)
#1 0x4ebc55 in ares_create_query /root/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180/BUILD/>ares_create_query.c:133:10
#2 0x4eb73d in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /root/FTS/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180/>target.cc:14:3
#3 0x4f5e93 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, >unsigned long) /root/Fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:493:13
#4 0x4f60c0 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned >long) /root/Fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:450:3
#5 0x4f73fb in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /root/Fuzzer/>FuzzerLoop.cpp:700:30
#6 0x4f7657 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop() /root/Fuzzer/>FuzzerLoop.cpp:732:5
#7 0x4eecb4 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int ()(unsigned >char const, unsigned long)) /root/Fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:567:6
#8 0x4ec790 in main /root/Fuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10
#9 0x7f5f2f60e82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/>libc.so.6+0x2082f)SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/c-ares-CVE-2016-5180>/BUILD/ares_create_query.c:196:3 in ares_create_query
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c087fffff00: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
0x0c087fffff10: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
0x0c087fffff20: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c087fffff30: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c087fffff40: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
=>0x0c087fffff50: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00[01]fa
0x0c087fffff60: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c087fffff70: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c087fffff80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c087fffff90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c087fffffa0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==20373:20373==ABORTING
MS: 2 ChangeByte-CrossOver-; base unit: >13c2ef7d0465439beabceb4941ba56718bec2752
0xa,0xff,0xff,0x5c,0xa,0x1,0x2e,0x1,0x2e,0xa,0xff,0xff,0x52,0x52,0x52,0x5c>,0x5c,0x5c,0x2e,
\x0a\xff\xff\\x0a\x01.\x01.\x0a\xff\xffRRR\\\.
artifact_prefix=’./’; Test unit written to ./>crash-0f2607879238b3c5c96020fa0cd2664d91928fff
Base64: Cv//XAoBLgEuCv//UlJSXFxcLg==
Fix
int ares_create_query(const char *name, int dnsclass, int type,
- unsigned short id, int rd, unsigned char **buf,
- int *buflen, int max_udp_size)
+ unsigned short id, int rd, unsigned char **bufp,
+ int *buflenp, int max_udp_size)
{
- int len;
+ size_t len;
unsigned char *q;
const char *p;
+ size_t buflen;
+ unsigned char *buf;
/* Set our results early, in case we bail out early with an error. */
- *buflen = 0;
- *buf = NULL;
+ *buflenp = 0;
+ *bufp = NULL;
- /* Compute the length of the encoded name so we can check buflen.
- * Start counting at 1 for the zero-length label at the end. */
- len = 1;
- for (p = name; *p; p++)
- {
- if (*p == '\\' && *(p + 1) != 0)
- p++;
- len++;
- }
- /* If there are n periods in the name, there are n + 1 labels, and
- * thus n + 1 length fields, unless the name is empty or ends with a
- * period. So add 1 unless name is empty or ends with a period.
+ /* Allocate a memory area for the maximum size this packet might need. +2
+ * is for the length byte and zero termination if no dots or ecscaping is
+ * used.
*/
- if (*name && *(p - 1) != '.')
- len++;
-
- /* Immediately reject names that are longer than the maximum of 255
- * bytes that's specified in RFC 1035 ("To simplify implementations,
- * the total length of a domain name (i.e., label octets and label
- * length octets) is restricted to 255 octets or less."). We aren't
- * doing this just to be a stickler about RFCs. For names that are
- * too long, 'dnscache' closes its TCP connection to us immediately
- * (when using TCP) and ignores the request when using UDP, and
- * BIND's named returns ServFail (TCP or UDP). Sending a request
- * that we know will cause 'dnscache' to close the TCP connection is
- * painful, since that makes any other outstanding requests on that
- * connection fail. And sending a UDP request that we know
- * 'dnscache' will ignore is bad because resources will be tied up
- * until we time-out the request.
- */
- if (len > MAXCDNAME)
- return ARES_EBADNAME;
-
- *buflen = len + HFIXEDSZ + QFIXEDSZ + (max_udp_size ? EDNSFIXEDSZ : 0);
- *buf = ares_malloc(*buflen);
- if (!*buf)
- return ARES_ENOMEM;
+ len = strlen(name) + 2 + HFIXEDSZ + QFIXEDSZ +
+ (max_udp_size ? EDNSFIXEDSZ : 0);
+ buf = ares_malloc(len);
+ if (!buf)
+ return ARES_ENOMEM;
/* Set up the header. */
- q = *buf;
+ q = buf;
memset(q, 0, HFIXEDSZ);
DNS_HEADER_SET_QID(q, id);
DNS_HEADER_SET_OPCODE(q, QUERY);
if (rd) {
DNS_HEADER_SET_RD(q, 1);
@@ -157,23 +131,27 @@ int ares_create_query(const char *name, int dnsclass, int type,
/* Start writing out the name after the header. */
q += HFIXEDSZ;
while (*name)
{
- if (*name == '.')
+ if (*name == '.') {
+ free (buf);
return ARES_EBADNAME;
+ }
/* Count the number of bytes in this label. */
len = 0;
for (p = name; *p && *p != '.'; p++)
{
if (*p == '\\' && *(p + 1) != 0)
p++;
len++;
}
- if (len > MAXLABEL)
+ if (len > MAXLABEL) {
+ free (buf);
return ARES_EBADNAME;
+ }
/* Encode the length and copy the data. */
*q++ = (unsigned char)len;
for (p = name; *p && *p != '.'; p++)
{
@@ -193,16 +171,32 @@ int ares_create_query(const char *name, int dnsclass, int type,
/* Finish off the question with the type and class. */
DNS_QUESTION_SET_TYPE(q, type);
DNS_QUESTION_SET_CLASS(q, dnsclass);
+ q += QFIXEDSZ;
if (max_udp_size)
{
- q += QFIXEDSZ;
memset(q, 0, EDNSFIXEDSZ);
q++;
DNS_RR_SET_TYPE(q, T_OPT);
DNS_RR_SET_CLASS(q, max_udp_size);
+ q += (EDNSFIXEDSZ-1);
+ }
+ buflen = (q - buf);
+
+ /* Reject names that are longer than the maximum of 255 bytes that's
+ * specified in RFC 1035 ("To simplify implementations, the total length of
+ * a domain name (i.e., label octets and label length octets) is restricted
+ * to 255 octets or less."). */
+ if (buflen > (MAXCDNAME + HFIXEDSZ + QFIXEDSZ +
+ (max_udp_size ? EDNSFIXEDSZ : 0))) {
+ free (buf);
+ return ARES_EBADNAME;
}
+ /* we know this fits in an int at this point */
+ *buflenp = (int) buflen;
+ *bufp = buf;
+
return ARES_SUCCESS;
}
--
2.9.3